Marcellus Shale:New York::Prudhoe Basin:Alaska. Why Not?

The New York Department of Environmental Conservation has put out a 46 megabyte document with proposed regulations on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing  of the Marcellus Shale formation in the state. The regs together with existing regs cover almost every known possibility of risk with some ways to mitigate the risk.  The DEC has asked for comments. I just posted one which you will see below. I don’t understand why these massive game-changing formations, the Marcellus, the Bakken and others, should not be treated the same as the Prudhoe Basin for the benefit of those states under which the formations exist.  These are depleting assets–and they produce GHG emissions. Why not create Permanent Funds designed to create something lasting beyond the lives of these assets. And why not create some mechanisms to deal with possible unintended consequences from the exploitation of these resources?  These formations and the technology to exploit them are game changers. They have certainly quieted the dialogue on Climate Change as we focus on Energy Independence and that natural gas takes us part way to reduced emissions relative to other fossil fuels. Let’s not forget: it is still a fossil fuel. I can’t solve everything in this post, but take a look at the suggestions for how to deal with the Marcellus. The submitted DEC comments begin below:

The SGEIS of September 7, 2011 provides a very comprehensive review of the risks associated with Horizontal Drilling and High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing and provides mitigation against many of the known risks either through regulation, approvals or restrictions on where drilling can take place. However, in its work, the DEC with the assistance of Alpha Environmental does recognize that there are substantial risks and actual likelihood of occurrences of damage as indicated by the restrictions on where drilling can take place as well as the substantial amount of requirements necessary to be allowed to drill, to handle the materials and back-flow from the processes, to reduce the GHG emissions and to transport materials and the ultimate hydrocarbons resulting from the drilling. The Marcellus and the Utica formations as well as others that may be exploited represent a significant economic opportunity for New York and other states as well as the United States in general. There will be much comment on the proposals put forth in this document. No doubt, the Oil and Gas Industry will have comments on the costs of the proposals as well as whether the risks highlighted are significant enough to warrant all the proposals for mitigation.  Economics will be a key factor. These formations, the Marcellus in particular, represent a low cost source of domestic energy, in some ways not too dissimilar from the Prudhoe basin, which has been a major economic boon for Alaska and the US.  I would like to suggest that, in addition to the proposals in the SGEIS, that the state of New York, in conjunction with the other states that exist over these formations, consider the following:

1)    Much as the state of Alaska created a Permanent Fund for collection of royalties on the production from the Prudhoe basin and other Oil and Gas activities, there should be a similar Permanent Fund developed for the states where hydraulic fracturing and any other approaches are used to exploit these enormous and game-changing formations. An appropriate royalty (Alaska takes 33%) should be determined. While a small portion of the royalties could go toward the various state operating budgets, the majority would be available for the creation of alternative energy or energy efficiency opportunities to ultimately replace or supplement the production from the formations, as they are depleted. It could also be used for training of local residents in the technical skills required to participate in the manpower requirements for the industry. The royalties could also be used to support the inspection efforts and other mitigating elements in order to support the O&G industry in its exploitation of the formations. The DEC has indicated that drilling approvals will be slow as there are not sufficient resources to meet the likely demand.

2)    While the DEC has proposed many mitigations to avoid problems, specifically with water contamination, there is no certainty that problems, anticipated or unanticipated, will not occur.  The O&G industry is certainly of the view that there are no serious problems that could affect the various water supplies in the state or water that either contains animal life or is important to land-based animals’ survival. It would make sense for the industry to put up a sizable bond to deal with any problems that do arise, requiring treatment plants or other means to correct any such problems. If as the industry states, the occurrence of such problems is remote, such a bond would bear a reasonable price, and could be targeted to specific elements. For example, while the NYC watershed has been excluded from drilling specifically, drilling will be allowed to take place not far from the borders of the watershed area. NYC consumes about 1 billion gallons per day of unfiltered water for which it collects about $1 billion a year. To construct treatment plants and maintain them could cost as much as $30 billion and add about a billion dollars per year to operating costs.  In the event that the unforeseen happens or appears to be happening, it would be good to know that funds are available to insure that sufficient potable water continues to exist.

3)    The DEC has also proposed rules to mitigate GHG emissions, which could be high in the early stages of the process if methane releases are not contained. It is understood that under steady state conditions natural gas produces fewer GHG emissions than coal or oil, but there are still emissions.  And such emissions can exceed those of other hydrocarbons if there are methane releases during the early hydrofracturing activity. A CO2 or CO2e charge per ton above a certain level of emissions would provide an economic incentive for the industry to keep emissions levels in the drilling, production and transportation activity to a minimum. Such a charge could revert to the Permanent Fund.

I leave it to the experts to determine the feasibility of these suggestions and the appropriate economics. Exploitation of the Marcellus and other gas reservoirs in New York and elsewhere in the country can have a major impact on the economics of the United Sates and can serve as a significant interim step toward reduction of GHG emissions if done properly. Much as Alaska, Texas and other states have benefited greatly from the exploitation of resources within the states, New York should as well. I commend the DEC for the thorough review of the risks associated with this method of drilling and production and its proposed rules for mitigation of those risks. I would hope that we use this opportunity to benefit the state and its residents appropriately, and consider the long-term effects of exploiting a depleting hydrocarbon resource.

This entry was posted in Alternative Energy, Climate Change, General Interest and tagged , , , , , , , , by Jack Rivkin. Bookmark the permalink.

About Jack Rivkin

Jack Rivkin retired in 2008 as EVP, CIO, Head of Private Asset Management of Neuberger Berman(NB) and from NB's Executive Management Committee. He was also on the Lehman(LB) Council on Climate Change(CC) and the NB CC Fund Advisory Board. He has been engaged with the United Nations and other entities on policy issues related to Private Capital and CC. He is an Associate Fellow of the Asia Society. He has continued on the NB Mutual Fund Board and with his CC responsibilities. He began his investment career in 68 as an analyst at Mitchell Hutchins(MH), and became Director of Research(DOR) there. After Paine Webber(PW) acquired MH, he served as DOR; CFO of PW; CEO of PWMH-the equity trading and investment arm of PW; Chmn of MH Asset Management and President of PW Capital. 87-92 he was DOR and, subsequently, Head of the Worldwide Equities Division of LB. 93-95, he served as a Vice Chairman and DOR at Smith Barney (now Citigroup). He was an EVP with Citigroup Investments 94-01, responsible for private equity investments. He was also an adjunct professor at Columbia University teaching a course in Security Analysis. He joined NB in 2002. He is the co-author of “Risk & Reward—Venture Capital and the Making of America’s Great Industries,” Random House, 1987. He is a regular guest on various media. He is the principal subject in a series of Harvard Business School cases describing his experience as DOR and Equity Head at LB. He has served as a director of a number of private companies and the NYSSA. He is currently a director of Idealab, Dale Carnegie, Operative, World Policy Institute and other private companies. He is a member of the Economic Club of NY, the Anglers Club, Theodore Gordon Fly Fishers, and a lifetime member of Trout Unlimited. He continues to be an active private equity investor when he isn’t fly fishing. Mr. Rivkin earned his Professional Engineering degree from the Colorado School of Mines and his MBA from the Harvard Business School

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